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optimal, policy for Red to follow. This then indicates to Blue her maximum opposition. In simple cases the optimal 
Red strategy is the same for both a deterministic and (quite different) stochastic modeL 
SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE 
(SEAD) AS AN INFORMATION DUEL 
Donald P. Gaver 
Patricia A. Jacobs 
1. Introduction: (Red) Enemy Air Defense and Its (Blue) Suppression (SEAD) 
A group of Blue striking aircraft (the Attackers) is entering a region, denoted as $R, to 
attack Red assets therein. Within the region are a number of Red air-defense installations, 
generically Enemy Air Defense (EAD) shooter subsystems. These, the Defenders, have the 
capacity to jam and shoot down (via ground-to-air missiles, or, eventually, advanced 
directed energy weapons), the Blue Attackers. They are coordinated by communication 
linkages, elements of which may be subject to attack physically and by Information 
Operations (IO) techniques. 
To oppose the above, ie. conduct suppression of enemy air d@enses (SEAD), the 
Blue force can select from various assets and tactics. This report discusses some optional 
combinations of systems and tactics in terms of simple state-space models, both 
deterministic and stochastic. The stochastic models are Markov processes that can be 
solved explicitly in the present circumstances, or, if desired, as object-oriented simulation 
models with stochastic features at a later stage (this latter step is not taken here). First we 
specify some elements of the interplay between Attackers and Defenders. Our presentation 
suggests several alternative/optional models, all of which have the feature that information 
acquisition can be both beneficial and harmful, and that a balance can be struck. Because 
of the stripped-down approach taken it is possible to explicitly characterize "optimal" 
strategies in simple form. For further, more extensive, work in the present area see 
Glazebrook, Gaver, and Jacobs (1998). 
2. Model D-1: An Exploratory Deterministic 2-Sided Model for SEAD 
2.1. The Setting and Modeling Approach 
We study a simplified version of an information duel between Blue Attackers (e.g. 
EA6B a/c equipped with air-to-ground HARM missiles) and Red (Area) Defenders, 
equipped with anti-air missiles. The latter are arranged in defense of a region, and are 
composed of a system of Early Warning Radars, R d t )  in number at time t, and a further 
system of radar-equipped anti-air missile shooters, called in our jargon Full Houses, and in 
number R A ( ~ )  at t. 
Scenario 
The scenario is this: at time t = 0 
(a) A force of Bu(0) Blue Attackers arrives, or is initially present, at the edge of the 
detection envelope of the Red EW force, of size/capability REW. The number of Blues 
present but undetected at t (in undetected state) is B&) for any t > 0. 
(b) Blues are detected at a rate in time that reflects the number of Red EW units 
available, and the number of Blues undetected at time t > 0. The number detected at time t 
(in the detected state) is denoted by Bo(t). 
(c) Blues detected (by Red) units are placed on a Red Full House system (shooter) 
target list, regarded as a service/queuing system with R A ( ~ )  “servers” (ie. missile 
shooters). A service time is a tracking time that terminates with a shot. 
(d) Red shooters have two modes of operation: 
(d-1) extensive radar emissions, in which case the probability of defensive missile kill of 
a Blue is relatively high, but retaliatory response by some Blues is quite likely, and also 
relatively effective; 
(d-2) minimum radar emissions, in which case Blues are less vulnerable (smaller kill 
probability of R on B), but Red Full House units are also less detectable. 
Here next are dynamic equations to describe the above interchange. 
2.2. Dynamic Equations 
This equation describes the evolution of the undetected Blue.population in the area at 
t, B&). It does not model saturation of the Red Early Warning system or its targeting and 
attrition; Blues undetected become detected in proportion to their number and the number 
of Red EW facilities, which for the present is R d t )  = R d O )  = REW. Next, 
either emitting extensively o;miniiIIy 
The complete Blue attrition term VRBRA(t) represents the rate at which Red 
shooters complete acquisition and tracking of detected Blues; the component term 
(BD ( t ) / ( l +  BD ( t)))  represents saturation of the Red forces by Blues in queue (on target 
list) to be shot: here ifBD(t) much exceeds unity then Red forces can only complete 
tracking at a rate proportional to their own (current) force size; see Filipiak (1988), and 
Gaver and Jacobs (1998). Saturability at a larger value can be adjusted by adding a 
parameter, and provisions for loss of Red track on Blue can likewise be made in the 
model; Blue decoys can be added. The term (8,& + ~ R Q P Q )  represents the kill probability 
of a Red shooter system that either chooses to shoot using extensive emission (probability 
of this choice is ~ R I ) ,  in which case the kill probability is PRl; otherwise Red utilizes a 
“quiet” mode, ie. with minimal emission (probability of this choice is ~ R Q  = 1 - ~ R I ) ,  so as 
a result the kill probability is PRQ. It is anticipated that PR1 is greater than PRQ. Although 
mode I leads to higher kill probability it also exposes the Red shooter to Blue detection 
and more effective retaliation. The parameter 8~1 is thus a Red decision variable. We shall 
furnish simple rules for choosing its value. 
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For Red actives (Full House systems), RA(t), we stipulate the following. 
J * 
Rate at which extensively emitting Red 
leads to rctalirtoly kills by Blue 
Rate at which minimalli emitting Red nsponsc 
leads to rrtaliato.tory kills by Blue 
Note that in (2.2) and (2.3) detected Blues are immediately targetable in this model; a 
realistic delay-prone communication network is not explicitly modeled here. The first 
term, ( VRBRA (t)( ::!$)), represents the (saturable) rate at which the current Red 
force terminates preliminary tracking and emits extensively while prosecuting (probability 
OH) Blue targets; this rate translates into a rate of counter-fire proportional to all live Blue 
forces (B&) + Bdt ) ) ;  Wattrition of the extensively-emitting (illuminating) Red by those 
Blue forces is at rate VBRPBRI. The subsequent term is the same as the last, but accounts for 
the occasions on which Red emits minimally (“is quieter”) and hence is killed at a smaller 
rate, VBRPBRQ. Although a mixed policy is available, and can well be time and state- 
dependent, it may turn out that a Red policy will be to set &I (hence 8RQ) to either one or 
zero; ie. adopt a pure strategy. An occasion when this is so follows. 
2.3. Analysis 
Suppose the “combat clock” is started at t = 0 ,  with all Blues assigned for SEAD 
initially present at that time. Equations (2.1) - (2.3) can be explicitly analyzed in closed 
form if &t) = 0 and R d t )  = REW, a constant. The solution to (2.1) is 
Let 
where E(t) = Bu(t)+BD(t); of course E(0) = Bo(0). 
Equation (2.3) can be rewritten as 
Divide equation (2.6) by (2.5), which results in 
Thus, 
Integrating results in 
(2.7) 
Notice that the solution is essentially parameterized by an exchange ratio, e R / G B .  Further, 
Blue may have the advantage since Red is vulnerable while it is prosecuting targets. 
Since at) = 0, if t + -, then either limB(t) = 0 or limRA(t) = 0. In fact, if 
r - w  t+- 
(2.10,a) 
Blue wins, killing all Red AD unitshhooters; if g(0) < 2- RA (O), then B(-) = 0 and J-T 
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(2.10,b) 
here Blue loses all forces, with Red AD survivors available for countering later attacks. 
It is always to the advantage of Red to maximize the exchange ratio B R / 8 s  : doing so 
either maximizes Blue’s losses if B(0) is sufficiently large, or maximizes Red’s survivors. 
Differentiation of the exchange ratio shows that 
PRI PRQ Red should emit extensively (6, = 1) if - >- 
PBRI PBRQ 
(2.11) 
or, equivalently, if 
Otherwise, Red illumination is held to a minimum, i.e. in @state. See Section 3 for the 
surprising reappearance of the above rule in the context of a seemingly quite different, 
stochastic model, context. 
In words, Red should emit extensively if her relative advantage from so doing exceeds 
the relative advantage to Blue fiom Blue’s capability to profit fiordcapitalize on Red’s 
use of extensive emission. It is noteworthy that in this model the optimal strategy for Red 
holds regardless of the value of VRB, Red’s attrition rate on Blue; nor is there dependence 
on &, the rate of detection of the Blues by the Red EW system. A more subtle model 
would represent Blue and Red reactions to actual occurrences, necessarily modeled 
stochastically interacting stochastically modeled; this step is postponed. 
Blue SEAD planners can clearly make use of the above for planning purposes, ie. to 
size an attacking force approximately. In a following section the same basic conclusion is 
deduced from a simple stochastic modeL 
Figures 1-3 display the numbers of Red and Blue alive assets as a function of time. In 
Figure 1, & R d t )  = 10 per hour; VRB = 10 per hour (service rate for each Red); PRj = 0.8 
(probability extensively-emitting Red kills a Blue a/c); PRQ = 0.5 (probability minimally- 
emitting Red kiUs a Blue a/c); VBRPBRI= 0.08 per hour (rate at which an extensively- 
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emitting Red is killed by a Blue dc); and VBRPBRQ= 0.02 per hour (rate at which a 
minimally-emitting Red is killed by a Blue a/c). Figure 1 compares the numbers of alive 
Red and Blue assets as a function of whether or not Red is always emitting extensively or 
always emitting minhmlly. Red emitting minimally results in fewer casualties to itself but it 
takes a longer time to kill specified numbers of Blues. In Figure 2, VBRPBRI = 0.05, with the 
other parameters the same. Comparing the extensively-emitting cases of Figures 1 and 2, 
more Reds survive and any specified number of Blues are killed sooner for VBRPBRI = 0.05. 
In Figure 3, the Reds are always emitting minimally, VBRPBRQ= 0.05, and the other 
parameters are as in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 3 displays the numbers of Red and Blue assets 
for differing values of the initial number of Blue a/c. Note that in the present situation the 
number of Blue aircraft needed to kill dl the Red AD sites is more than twice the number 
of AD sites. An increase in Blue lethality should have great leverage. 
3. Model S-1: Elementary Stochastic Duel Between One (Red) AD System 
and a Succession of Blue Suppressors 
Suppose a single Red (E)AD unit is in opposition to a Blue force intent on removing 
this obstacle. The Blue force might be platforms that are HARM-launchers devoted to 
suppressing enemy air defense (SEAD); they come within (Red) range so as to have better 
access to the target, but in so doing expose themselves to attrition. Our model yields 
explicit formulas for assessing attrition tradeoffs in the present simple setting. 
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Number of Red and Blue Assets Alive at Time t 
R(O)=9; B(O)=lO 
solid:Red always emits extensively 
dotted:Red always emits minimally 
parameters: xiew=l 0, nurb=l O,pi=O.8,pq=O.5 
pbri=0.05,pbrq=0.02 
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(a) Each time Red fires it is in quiet mode (emitting mhhdly)  with probability &Q, 
and otherwise in extensive emittinglradiating mode with probability 6RI = (1 - 6RQ) .  Here 
ON is a possible decision variable; see Section 2. 
(b) Given that Red is in the extensive emission mode (is emitting), Red is killed by a 
K B  = <  
rO with probability 6RQ(l- PRQ)PBRQ + 6 M ( 1  - PRI)P.IU 
1 
O + K i  with probability ~ R , ( ~ - P R , ) ( ~ - P B R ~ ) + ~ R , ( ~ - P R I ) ( ~ - P B I U )  
1 + K i  with probability 6RpPRa(l-PBRQ)+ 6RIPR,(l-pBH) 




Now take conditional expectations as in (3.1) to find 
since E[KL] = E[KB]. 
If = 1, then 
If&]= 1, then 
, then PRQ PRI If->- 
PBRQ PBRI 
For Red, the policy that maximizes the expected number of Blues killed before it is 
eliminated is determined by a simple transaction kill ratio 




Emit minimally if - pRQ >- 
(Extensive and minimal emissions are equally effective if equality holds.) 
This is exactly the condition (2.1 1 )  found for the deterministic model. 
Model S-2: 
Assume there are i types of Blue targets: i = 1,  ... I. Let PRQ(~) (respectively P R I ( ~ )  be 
the probability of a quiet (respectively extensive emitter) Red killing a type i Blue target. 
Let a be the probability a Blue target is of type i; i = 1,  . . . I. 
Solving, 
follows that Red would like to follow a strategy that maximizes the expected number of 
Blue kills; a convenient heuristic is analogous to (3.4), applied to individual target classes. 
For a target of type i, 
pRI(i) pRQ(i) Emit extensively if ->- 
PBRI PBRQ 
PRQ 6 )  > PRI (i) Emit minimally if -
PBRQ PBRI 
The suggested heuristic policy for Blue that approximately minimizes the maximum value 
of E[&] is to always present those targets of type i B  to Red where i B  is 
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This model gives Red credit for being able to perfectly distinguish different types of Blue 
targets (certainly optimistic for Red), focusing on a priority list related to vulnerability of 
Red. It implicitly simply omits any attention by Red to valueless targets, such as decoys; 
prosecuting decoys both wastes the Red ammunition inventory and betrays Red presence. 
Subsequent models will rectify this simplification. 
Another, and related, missing feature is the assumption that all Reds can correctly 
classify the different types of Blue Attackers. This unrealism may also be rectified. 
Model S-3. Allowing for Red Misclassification of Blue Target Types 
Suppose there are I Blue target types. Let ai be the probability a Blue target is of type 
i, i = 1 ,  . . ., I .  Let be the probability Red classifies a Blue type i target as a type j target. 
i j  
To find the values of 8RQ( i )  that maximize E[KB], note that the value of & ~ ( i )  can be 
determined for each j independent of the other values. Fix the values of 8,&) i z j ,  then 





the conditional probability the target is of type i given it is classified as type j ;  cl(O), c2(0), 






for j = 1, ...71, 0 I & ~ ( i )  51, it follows that the heuristic/approximate strategy to 
maximize the expected number of Blue kills for Red is as follows: 
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For a target that is classified as type j 
PRQ (9 c n(ilj) - > c n( ilj) -
i=l PBRI i-1 PBRQ 
I PRI ( i )  I Emit extensively if 
(3.13) 
PRI ( i )  PRO (9 Emit minimally if n(ilj) -c n(ilj) -
I PBRI i PBRQ 
where (3.10) gives n($). 
Finally, in an Appendix, we consider a more ambitious but again deterministic model 
that allows for presence of Blue decoys introduced to’ economically deceive Red into 
firing, and hence revealing itself. 
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DETERMINISTIC INFORMATIONAL DYNAMICS WITH ATTACKER DECOYS PRESENT 
Suppose that at time t after campaign initiation there are Bk(t) active Blue Attackers in 
region %, within reach of any Reds (EAD units); let Bsi(t) be the number of Blue attacker 
counterfeits (decoys or surrogates); these can attract Red missile shots and are vulnerable. 
Here i = U or D,  s igd jhg  undetected or detected. 
Red States, and State Transition 
Red EAD units are present in the region 9L at t = 0; some can leave, and others can 
enter. Those within the region can either befaed in place and potentfly active against 
Blue intruders, or in motion from one location (hiding place and launching spot) to 
another. 
Assume that when a Red is in motion it may be detected by Blue "overhead" assets, 
e.g. JSTARS or possibly satellites, but not immediately nor with certainty, and assume 
that such detections are corrupted by Red deliberate false targetddecoys and/or by 
involuntary false targets. Importantly, and as before, when a Red launches a missile against 
a Blue Attacker, it reveals itself and its location: if the anti-Blue missile is quietly guided 
(emission is used minimally) the probability of its detection is positive, but if the launcher 
emits extensively to perform guidance its presence is revealed with much higher 
probability. It is assumed that such Red (EAD) presence is recorded on Blue memory data 
bases and acted upon: the locations may be attacked, or observed and stimulated to fire 
again to reveal presence. Of course if the Red has moved, any Blue attack at a (former) 
location is likely to be useless (unless another Red has moved into the locality). Thus a 
Red unit can be in a moving and undetectedldetected state, a f a e d  and 
undetectedldetected state, with an additional recorded history of recent emission or none. 
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Model D-2 
The following variables enumerate the numbers of Red EAD units in the various states 
at time t. By rights, these are discrete-valued (counts) random processes. But we describe 
them generically in terms that might be known, and unknown, to the Blue forces. 
R d t )  = number of active Red units that are jiied in location and undetected 
R u ~ ( t )  = number of active Red units that are fixed in location and detected. These can 
have been detected by general Blue surveillance, e.g. ground observation or 
UAVs, or have revealed themselves from a recent missile shot at a Blue: 
either Attacker or Decoy. These Red units are subject to Blue 
attack/prosecution. They can change status by moving; during such a period 
they can be detected, possibly targeted, but cannot themselves launch 
missiles. Those that go into motion have obliterated the identity and location 
information given by a previous shot, especially one that utilized 
emissiodillumination. 
Rmu(t)= number of active Red units in motion and undetected; 
R m ( t )  = number of active Red units in motion and detected. 
Also define 
RSFU(t), RsFD(~), RsMU(~), R S M D ( f )  = number(s) of Red Decoys (Red Surrogates) in the 
above categories at time t. Finally, 
R d t )  = number of active Reds killed by time t 
RSK(t) = number of Red Decoys killed by time t 
BAU(t) = number of undetected active Blues 
B&) = number of detected active Blues 
Bs&) = number of undetected Blue surrogates 
Bs&) = number of detected Blue surrogates 
B d t )  = number of active Blues killed by time t 
Parameters: 
&(t) (respectively &(t)) = arrival rate of active Red (respectively Blue) shooters to 
area 
&&) (respectively &&)) = arrival rate of Red (respectively Blue) surrogates to area 
p: = mean time an active Red shooter moves 
pi1 = mean time a Red shooter stays in a fixed position 
~ M F ( D ,  U) = probability a detected moving Red shooter that stops is lost from track 
a(BIR) (respectively Gc(RIB)) = rate at which a Red (respectively Blue) detected Blue 
(respectively Red) target is assigned to a Red 
(respectively Blue) shooter 
= probability a Red (respectively Blue) shooter emits 
minimally when shooting at a target (is quieter) 
= probability a Red (respectively Blue) shooter emits 
extensively when shooting at a Blue (respectively Red) 
target 
&(RIB) (respectively &(BIZ?)) = probability a quieter Red (respectively Blue) shooter is 
detected while shooting and put on Blue’s 
(respectively Red’s) targeting list 
ORQ (respectively ~ B Q )  
ON (respectively OBI) 
&(RIB) (respectively &(BIR)) = probability an extensively-emitting Red (respectively 
Blue) shooter is detected while shooting and put on 
Blue’s (respectively Red’s) targeting list 
&(RIB) = probability an undetected fixed Red is detected by Blue 
&(RIB) = probability a moving Red is detected by Blue and put on his targeting list 
peK(B1R) (respectively peK(R1B)) = probability a minimally-emitting Red (respectively 
Blue) kills a Blue (respectively Red) target 
~EK(BIR) (respectively p&?IB)) = probability an extensively-emitting Red (respectively 
Blue) kills a Blue (respectively Red) target 
vM(RIB) = rate at which a detected moving Red target is lost from track 
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v(B1R) = rate at which a detected Blue target is lost by Red 
pc(R(B) (respectively pc(BIR)) = probability Blue (respectively Red) correctly 
classifies the detected Red (respectively Blue) target 
as active or surrogate 
b * 
rate at which detected I - -  
at 
moving active Reds stop undetected active undetected fixed 
and ~IE lost when fued adive Reds move moving Reds stop 
r 1 
BAD (t ) + BSLJ (t)  RAFU ( t )  
- 1 + (BAD ( t )  + BSLJ (t)) RAFU ( t )  + RMLJ ( t )  
rate at which undetected 




L J \  * J 
rate at which deleckd moving Reds 
stop and arc still detcded 
rate at which Blue deteds and 
correctly classifies active Red targets 
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rate at which und*iacd active moving 
Reds arc deteded and classified C o d y  
rate at whifh d- 
moving active R& a n  lost 
v 
rate at which detected 





rate at which dacacd moving active Rcds arc killed 
rate at which rinda;ctcd moving active 
Reds arc daadcd and correctly classified 
rate at whi& detcdcd 
moving adive R& arc lost 
7 ’-  
rate at which fixed adive rate at which movmg 
Reds move active Reds stop 
sumgates stop moving surrogates start moving 
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UC " J 
rate at which fixed 
Red surrogates are detected aod 
inoorrcctly classified as active targets 
rate at which detected moving 
Red sunogates becane fixed 
and are not lost 
b 
nte at which fixed Red surrogates are killed 
at * - 
rate at which fixed .' rate at which undetectul movmg - 
Red surrogates strut Red surrogates are detected undetected moving 
to move by Blue Red surrogates 
bccome fixed 
. - .  
\ J at * - 
rptc at which undetected moving 
Red surrogates are dctcdcd 
by Blue and m i s c l d  as being active 
detected moving Red 
become fixed 
__ 
rate at which Blue kills d e h  moving Red sunogates 
to area 
1 
Rtc at which shooting a d &  Blua arc ddccted by Red J 
rate at whiih daeaed 
active Blue are lost 
rate at which undeteEted active Blue are 





L-  rate at which shooting u n d d a c t i v e  Blua arc detected by Red ' _1 
at which und&ctcd active Blu; 
arc detecred and comclly classified aetive B lue  arc lost 
rate at which detecttd Blua arc killed by Reds 
amvaimte of dccedio; of Blue 
Blue surrogates surrogates by Red 
(A. 10) 




at which &mgatc Blua 
am detected and incomctly 
classified as active 
\ I 
rate at which detected incomctly classified Blue suno&ata arc killed 
(A. 13) 
We do not explore these expressions numerically at this time, although such is within 
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